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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF 'i'HE .
STATE OF UTAH

*************
GILBERT CAPSON and LINDA
CAPSON, his wife,
CASE !JO,

Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

14524

vs.
A. J. DEMI READY MIX CONCRETE
COMPANY and ARCTIC CIRCLE, INC.,
Defendants and
Respondents.

**************
APPELLMJTS ' BRIEF

**************
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE:
This is an action for damages for personal injuries
sustained by the Plaintiff, GILBBRT CAPSON,

in an industrial

accident, allegedly as the result of the negligence of the
Defendant.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT:
The District Court, per JUDGE DAVID B. DEE, granted
Defendant, A. J. DEAN READY MIX CONCRETE COMPANY, /.lotion for
Sur.unary Judgment and dismissed the action with prejudice.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL:
Appellants seek the reversal of the Judgment below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
On or about July 26, 1972, the Appellant, GILBERT
cAPSON, \vas subcontractor doing foundation work for ARCTIC
CIRCLE, INC.

This work was taking place on the prer.1ises of

ARCTIC CIRCLE at 1700 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.
ARCTIC CIRCLE was the general contractor on the
job and had already completed doing the excavation work.

This

excavation was approximately FIVE (5) feet below grade level.
It 1;a" the Appellant's responsibility to complete the foundation
work inside of the excavation.
Concrete for the foundation was ordered from A. J.
DBAN READY !UX CONCRETE COMPANY I

the Respondent herein.

The

concrete was to.be poured into the forms provided and set up
by the Appellant.

_While the Appellant was __ in the process of

pouring concrete into the forms, the bank on which the A. J.

DEAN COMPANY truck was sitting gave way, severely injuriny the
Appellant.

This action was commenced against ARCTIC CIRCLE and

A. J. DEAN READY MIX COMPAUY.

In a prior action, Judge Sawaya

dismissed Co-Defendant ARCTIC CIRCLE on the basis that Appellant
failed to state a cause of action against the Defendant, ARCTIC
CIRCLE.

Appellant appealed the dismissal to the Utah State Supreme

Court, which affirmed the District court's dismissal on November
4, 1976.

capson v. A. J. Dean Ready Mix Concrete co. and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Arctic Circle, Inc.,

556 P.2d 505.

On September 8, 1977, the Third Judicial Di:trict
Court, per JUDGE DAVID B. DEE, granted Respondent's notion
for Sununary Judgment.

This appeal followed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT ARE NOT
CO-EMPLOYEES UNDER u.c.A. § 35-1-42.
In its .Memorandum of points and authorities in
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Respondent clainec
that Appellant and Respondent were "co-employees" under LC,;.,
§35-1-42; therefore, any injury caused by Respondent was cm- '
pensable only under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

It is

Respondent's rationale that since U. C.A. §35-1-42 makes both
Respondent and Appellant employees of ARCTIC CIRCLE, that the;
were co-enployee s.

Therefore, Under U. C. A. § 3 5-1-6 0 AJJ!-OeLor.'.

is precluded from suit· against Respondent.
rationale is faulty.

But Respondent's

As Justice Maughan pointed out in his

dissenting opinion in Shupe vs. Wasatch Electric

Company, Inc.

546 P.2d 869, U.C.A. §35-1-42 is divided up into TWO (2) subsections-- the first section defining "statutory employer" ans:
second section defines "statutory employee".

Justice Maug~

interpreted the statute in this way:
The language of §35-1-42 clearly shows
.. ,
The initial section provw~
a legislative intent.
The following shall constitute employers
subject to the provision of this title: Title is
the key word here.
Thus, the definition of
§42 insofar as a "statutory employer" is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Fundingis
for digitization
provided
by the Institute of Museum
involved
to be
applied
to and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the entire act.
In contrast, Subsection 2
provides those who are deemed "statutory
employees" are made so only for the purpose
of that section.
Section is the key word.
The pertinent provisions of Subsection 2 are:
Where any employer procures any work to
be done wh0lly or in part for him by a contractor
over whose work he retains supervision or control,
and such work is a part or process in the trade or
business of the employer, such contractor, and all
persons employed by him, and also contractors
under him, shall be deemed within the meaning of
this section, employees of such original employer
The legislature specifically has expressed
an intention that its definition of "statutory
employer" remain constant throughout the
Workmen's Compensation Act •.. It is expressly
confined to those provisions wherein the
responsibility flowing to them from the "statutory
employer" is set forth.
'1'hus :ust because Respondent and Appellant may be "statutory
employees" of ARCTIC CIRCLE, they are not co-employees under
U.C.A. §35-1-60; and therefore, that section is not applicable.
To hold otherwise would completely ignore the clear intention
of the legislature and the underlying policy under U.C.A. §35-1-42.
Again, quoting Justice Maughan:
The concept of "all persons in the same
employment" does not include subcontractors, their
employees on the same project; thus, they are not
irnmuned as co-employees of the emtloyer of an
employee of ~1 c;eneral contractor.
(emphasis added)
The legislature in enacting §35-1-42 was
not concerned with third party tort liability;
its purpose was to establish a general statutory
definition of an employer, to assure that a general
contractor would guarantee compensation for the
employees of a subcontractor. Where a statute such
as §35-1-42 makes the 0eneral contract.or the employer

12 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, §72.20,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Pp. -~-44 to 14-46.
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for t~~ purposes of the compensation statute
certainly he should enjoy
the regular 1·r=
·
,
•uuUn1 t"
of an employer from third party suit when the '
facts are such that he could be made liable
for compensat~on.
The majority of the Courts
have so held.
Further, Larson on Workmen's Compensation
Laws states:
• • overall responsibility of the
general contractor for getting subcontractors
insured, and his latent liability for compensation if he does not, should be sufficient to
remove him from the category of "third party".
He is under a continuing potential liability;
he has thus assumed the burden in exchange for
which he might well be entitled to immunity
from damage suits, regardless of whether on the
facts of a particular case actual liability exists, I
In the present case, ve have a subcontractor bring 1:.:
I

suit against another subcontractor.

Neither of the subcontract\

had any insurance that would cover the other subccnt1-,:.ct0:; nor.
\.;ere they under any obligation to Luy any insurance covering tr:
other subcontractor.

Thus, neither should be given the irnnumt

provided by U.C.A. §35-1-60.
POIHT II.
AFFIRMANCE OF THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION CONFLICT
DIRECTLY WITH U .C .A. §35-1-62.
If this Court should affirm the Lower Court's
decision in granting Summary Judgment, U.C.A. §35-1-62 would
become meaningless.

i

The pertinent provisions of §35-1-62 provJ

When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this title, shall have

2 2 Larson's ~·lorkmen' s Compensation Law, §72.3l,

p. 14-47.
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been caused by a wrongful act or neglect of
~n~ther person not in the same employment, the
inJured employee, or in the case of h1-s aeath
his dependents may claim compensation and the'
injure~ employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an action for damages against
such third person.
This section allows an employee to bring suit against
a person "not in the same employment" to r.-.cover damages resulting
from the wrongful act or negligence of another person.

In cases

previously decided by this Court, it has been held that a subcontractor or any of his employees cannot bring suit against the
general contractor.
508 P.2d 805

Adamson vs. Oakland Construction company,

(1973), and Smith vs. Brown, 493 P.2d 994 (1971).

Conversely, it has been held that the general contractor or his
employee cannot maintain an action for damages against a subcontractor.

Gallegos vs. Stringham, 442 P.2d 31 (1968); Shupe

vs. Wasatch Electrical Company, Inc., Supra; and Peterson vs.
Fowler, 493 P.2d 997 and 510 P.2d 523.

If now this Court were to

hold that subcontractors are co-employees under U.C.A. §35-1-60,
it would proclude any suits between persons who work on the same
job.

Thus, u.c.A. §35-1-62 would have little or no application.

Under the Lower Court's ruling, wherein subcontractors are
prohibited from bringing suit against other subcontractors,
Ap;)ellant cannot imagine any situation in which any class working
on the saue joL could sue another class working on that job;and
therefore, under the lower court's ruling, U.C.A. §35-1-62 would be
meaningless.

On the other hand, if this Court were to hold that

even though the Respondent is a statutory employee of .i\RC'I'IC CIRC:.'...Er
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he is not necessarily a co-employee of the Appellant

s Under

Therefore, the Appellant should be able~

U.C.A. §35-1-60.

bring suit against.the Respondent if he meets the qua l'if icatior
of U.C.A. §35-1-62.

This interpretation of the above-quot~

statutes would give some meaning to U.C.A. §35-1-60.
As to the questions as whether the Appellant can~
under U.C.A. §35-1-62, the case
seems to be very helpful.
Supreme Court.

of Peterson vs. Fowler, Supra,

This case was twice brought before t

In that case, an employee of the general contro:i

was assigned by the general contractor to assist a subcontractc:
in putting ceiling tile on the top of a large sports arena. 1"
order to place the ceiling tile, the subcontractor and his
employees used a scaffold set up by a scaffolding company. In,
the process -of applying the ceiling tile, the scaffolds fell ar..
the general contractor's employee was killed.
sentative brought suit against

His personal re1:

the subcontractor, the

architect, the company that supplied the scaffolding and the cq
that erected the scaffolding.

In the first case, the Supreme(,:'

held that the employee was working under the control of the sut·
contractor and therefore was engaged in the "same employment":
the subcontractor.

In the second case, 510 P. 2cl 523, the Courtl

that the company that furnished the scaffolding and the subcond
that built the scaffolding were not in the "same employment" wrl
deceased employee.

The Court pointed out that the company that

supplied the scaffolding was simply a mc;terialman to the subcontractor and therefore was not in the "same employmen t " as
subcontractor or the decedent.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tr

The present case seer.is to be very srnilar.

In the

present case, the Respondent was merely a materialman to ARCTIC
CIRCLE.

Therefore, it cannot be said that it was in the "same

employment" as the Appellant.

And as Justice Maughan pointed

out in his dissent in Shupe:
The definition of a third party "not in
the same employment" is not the subject of
§35-1-42 (2). The concept of "all persons in
the same employment" does not include subcontractors, and their employees on the same
project; thus, they are not irnmuned as coemployees of an employee of a general contractor.
(Emphasis added)
CONCLUSION
The manner in which U.C.A. §35-1-42 was drafted makes
it clear that the legislature did not intend to make the Appellant
and the Respondent co-employees.

Although it is true that both

Respondent and Appellant may have been statutory employees of
ARCTIC CIRCLE for the purposes of U.C.A. §35-1-42, this does net
mean that they were co-employees for the purposes of U.C.A. §35-160, or engaged in the same employment with the purpose of U.C.A.
§35-1-62.

If this Court were to uphold the Lower Court's decision

granting Summary Judgment, it would be saying that a subcontractor
is barred from bringing suit against another subcontractor, and
would thus make

u.c.A.

§35-1-62 a nullity.

The Appellant respectfully asks the Court to reverse
the Trial Court's decision and remand this case for a trial on the
merits.
Respectfully submitted,
FULLMER & HARDING
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Mailed TWO l2)

copies of the foregoing Appellant's

Brief to TIMOTHY R. HANSEN, Esq. Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent, A.J. DEAN READY MIX CONCRETE COMPANY, 702 Kearns
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101 on this

r;)i--~ay

December, 1977.
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